From the early days of financial crisis, ZN given the subject utmost attention. On our pages discussed in detail severe downturn in the economy, the inflation problem, the negotiations with the IMF, the price jumps and the sharp decline in revenue. We could not fail to excite as useless and stupid the majority of government and the parliamentary anti-crisis measures, and the threat of default, the problem with the solvency of banks, currency speculation and lack of procedures for the refinancing of the bank.

from the PN were all possible points of view about what is happening - ministers and deputies, heads of regulatory and law enforcement agencies, academics and analysts, bankers and their clients, ambassadors, businessmen, lawyers. To complete the picture is not enough, perhaps, the views of only one of the most important desizhnmeykerov country - NBU chairman Volodymyr Stelmakh.

Today we

eliminates the gap. Of course, a great temptation to arrange a meeting in the first person National Bank interrogation bias for each of the huge backlog of issues. But hardly communicate in a similar vein, would be informative and useful. After all, the interview is not rubber, and delve into a discussion on a particular issue, we would not be able to hear the views of Vladimir Stelmakh on many other issues. In today's difficult situation for the society, which fell on the head of the crisis, the devaluation, the total negative, distrust, mutual accusations of politicians and politicians, much more important to try to find answers to the questions - Why wait for what to do and how to live on. Here is a version of the Heads of National Bank.

- Vladimir, how do you assess the current state of financial markets and banking system?

- Until very recently, when I asked this question, the easiest way was to tell the anecdote in response. The banker calls a colleague, and greeted, asked: How are you? - Heard in response: Okay. - Bormochet: Sorry, wrong number. And hang up.

in recent weeks in the financial system of Ukraine has shown clear signs of stabilization. First of all, it can be seen on the situation in the foreign exchange market. The Head of State has already voiced the information that the National Bank has even bought the currency on the interbank market, adding reserves. This, among other things, contributed to the strengthening of the market, and the official exchange rate of hryvnia to the dollar last month, more than 9 cop. (from 7,7 to 7,61 UAH /USD.), or 1.2%.

exchange stabilization occurred as a result, that the people calm, and thanks to the gradual alignment of the trade balance.

What would they say, the psychological aspect was one of the main factors of the devaluation of hryvnia. According to the balance of payments, from November 2008 to April 2009 the first increase in cash outside banks amounted to 7.1 billion dollars

significantly reduced foreign exchange remittances from guest workers, who also previously created a good influx of currency into Ukraine. Preliminary estimates indicate that private transfers from abroad during the five months of this year decreased by 23.7% and amounted to 1.47 billion dollars compared with 1.9 billion dollars over the same period of 2008.

reduce the passions and helped foreign exchange auctions to buy currency at the market under the non-cash repayment of loans to the public, small and medium-sized businesses. And since the beginning of May the situation has changed: a proposal to exchange cash market increased by almost one and a half times, outweigh the demand for $ 150 million

Stabilization of course positively affected the mood of investors. As banks began to slowly return deposits. If in the first quarter of this year, monthly growth of household deposits had negative value, in April and May they were already positive - 0,6 and 0,7% respectively. So we have even a small but strong trend of increasing population growth rate of deposits in the banking system. And deposits are growing both in national and foreign currencies.

helped improve the situation and the actions of the bank. In addition to these target auction sales of foreign currency to repay loans to individuals, and this continued support the liquidity of banks, and additional measures to stabilize the banks,and adequate interest policy. In particular, in order to consolidate the positive developments in the financial market and promote the economic development of the National Bank of Ukraine has declined from 15 June, the discount rate to
12 to 11%.

- One of the main factors that determine the level of confidence in the banks - the return of the frozen deposits. Please confirm, so lifted or not a moratorium on the early withdrawal of deposits? As banks are fulfilling their obligations to customers?

- The crisis affected most 25-27 banks, 15 of which put a temporary administration and declared a moratorium on compliance with the requirements of lenders. However, we plan to ensure that those banks which are now in relation to the moratorium has delayed payments, too, were obliged to implement them.

NBU

now preparing a document that a moratorium on the implementation of the commitments did not extend to the payment functions of the banks that they should be carried out in accordance with Article 47 of the Banking Act.

As for deposits, banks are obliged to pay in time, as soon expire during their deployment in the bank. Term of payment is linked to the fact that deposits were invested in bank assets. Generally, the investor must make a choice - either income on their money, or at any time have access to them. If the investor chooses the latter, it should put money into a current account or to rent a bank safe deposit box. But if the money invested in the bank for a specified period for the purpose of obtaining income, the investor must understand that this money will not lie on a shelf, and will be issued as a credit to another person (or entity). And if so, to obtain the money necessary to wait until the end of the term deposit.

- An important element in reducing panic population was the cessation of public accusations against the National Bank of Ukraine on the part of the Head of Government. What is more important cause of strengthening the hryvnia - the political or economic component?

- Of course, an end to the destructive debate has played an important positive role. When it's not, again the key role played by market forces, and are now course strengthened the market. As I said earlier, we have almost reached equilibrium in trade balance. Obviously, the forced devaluation occurred, however painful it may be perceived in society, and in the National Bank, began to show positive results.

positive factor was the resumption of cooperation with the IMF, the flow of trenches from which largely compensates for the outflow of currency in the financial account. And most importantly, the national economy also had an opportunity to shake in order to raise competitiveness, including through increased and product quality.

This shift to a flexible kursoobrazovaniyu contributed relatively rapid leveling of foreign trade deficits. Of course, the depreciation of UAH complicate maintenance of bank loans made in foreign currency. However, the current extreme conditions in this matter, in any case, there would be no easy answers. His ultimate escalation allowed to proceed to address the fundamental problems that began in March 2003.

As for the currency gap between bank loans and deposits, they should serve as a partial leveling program recapitalize the banking system. But only partially. Since the responsibility for these foreign exchange imbalances and must be borne by the banks for years to defend their right to an unconditional extension of foreign currency lending.

- Is there a real prospect for the further strengthening of the course, to the extent justified by the forecast of its eventual fall of destabilization?

- holdings in dollars, established by our commercial bank accounts in foreign banks now account for about
4 billion if the banks are now sold 1,5-2 billion dollars, the question of course would not stand.

To do this, we changed the method of calculating the monetary stance. However, some banks with foreign capital have taken in this matter destructive position, requiring a preferential and special treatment. I do not accept this approach.

Already

if foreign capital was settled on long-term entry into the banking system of Ukraine, then in his own interest to maintain the stability not only of the system, but the Ukrainian economy. Since the development of the sustainable development depends the ultimate effectiveness of the foreign investment. It is clear that today the domestic economy as well, and the world, is not the best of times. Exclusivity challenges that we are forced to confront the demands exceptional inherently decisions. Not surprisingly, some of them are strikingly discordant with the usual rules. However, accounting for reminding that some of the usual rules ultimately led to the upheavals that have more than one year, experiencing the world economy.

All stakeholders should be equal. And to work on the Ukrainian laws. We are willing to compromise on the timing or something else, but completely renounce their intentions are not going to.

During a recent visit to Switzerland, we learned about the experience of the central bank of this country and made a very important conclusion: the European Central Bank, is actively enforce individual regulations with respect to their banks, such as increased capital adequacy. I do not understand why we can not apply the same rules.

- What is now the main threat to the stability of the currency market and the financial system? What do you see the main problems hampering the restoration of confidence in the banking system?

- As before, now the main threat of destabilization - politics. And more precisely, ovladevshy overwhelming majority of our politicians and inconsumable, despite everything, the revolutionary enthusiasm of social populism. And it has all the other problems of the Ukrainian economy metastases.

confidence in the banking system depends primarily on the credibility of the hryvnia. And we, unfortunately, have not been able to adopt the status of the national currency as one of the main attributes of statehood. Dollarization only formal part of the Ukrainian economy to date, more than 30%. As I said, over the previous six months in the shadow took about $ 7 billion How much currency is under the pillow citizens - we can only assume.

We like to refer to the Chinese experience. So I'll tell you that in China's money supply is about 160% of GDP - this is where the level of monetization. But there is no problem, since a large portion of these funds lies with the deposits in banks, the propensity to save which, as in Japan, is very high.

As we begin to move in that direction - this is one of the key issues that determines the stability and the hryvna, and the availability of investment resources, and its value.

We also see almost the entire housing market, both primary and secondary, was actually completely built on a monetary basis. And not only on credit, but estimated. After all, when to buy and sell real estate only in the accounts shall include the amount of UAH, and reduced several times, because nobody wanted to pay extra charges. And all the basic calculations were carried out mostly in foreign currency.

because there was a huge turnover of the currency as the market land prices due to the housing deficit grew as a yeast, with more whip on foreign bank loans. That's because real estate sector has been focused on commercial lending, has a high income.

- Why is the National Bank does not prohibit foreign loans? Because they were cheaper for the economy?

- What currency loans have been cheaper - it is fiction. With insurance, hidden commissions and similar features banks bring their value up to 46% per annum. This shows our audit.

Why not restricted currency loans? It is very difficult to make such decisions in a country where everyone wanted to quickly zazhit well. Construction, which was one of the main engines of economic growth, there must be a makeup credit resources, which were mostly in foreign currency. Therefore, to limit foreign currency loans would stifle their own growth.

Whether currency lending long debated in the NBU Board. A collective decision was in favor of maintaining this type of lending.

- whether it should be understood that you salute adopted by the Verkhovna Rada of this week a ban on foreign currency loans?

- no doubt. As I said, its capacity has been one of the main causes of the financial sector the major imbalances. On the existence of the greatest risks National Bank warned bankers and people in recent years a number of occasions. Many bankers are not heeded these warnings, the years defending their right to an unconditional extension of foreign currency lending. So, once again, the responsibility for these currency imbalances must be borne by the banks themselves.

- Then why is the National Bank was unable to stimulate low-cost loans in UAH?

- Let's clearly having accents. When it comes to providing low interest rates in terms of inflation, then someone must pay the creditor the difference between the rate under which they agree to lend money, and one that could make a borrower. Such arrangements are being successfully operated in including in the Ukraine - I am referring to the budget of the compensation cost of credit for different categories of borrowers.

Another point is that the funds for such compensation in the budget is not as big as anyone would. But that is not subject to central bank. Reduce the price of loans by issuing means impossible: Issue of unsecured money for any, even the good causes would lead to their devaluation, inflation and further accelerate the growth of prices of credits. What are the budgetary costs to cut in order to increase the amount of compensation of interest rates on loans and what categories of borrowers, through such a mechanism to maintain - it is the exclusive competence of the government and parliament.

in 2005, when I returned to work at the National Bank, 937 thousand families in need of better living conditions. To solve this problem, it was necessary to give an 8 bln. loans for three to four years. Now the housing needs of 1 million 250 thousand families, and the price issue has risen to 12-15 billion
grn. targeted credits for up to five years. Select the resources - not a problem for the National Bank, however, but to ask for money, nobody wanted to and now does not want to deal with this problem seriously.

much more profitable to engage in the provision and resale of land for development. Why fight for the decline in prices, if their growth has officials fantastic profit?

Even

initiative to complete the construction of residential facilities readily 50% and higher, which could help to revive not only the construction sector, we could not bring to mind. The issue of credit for the state, especially in construction, has always been linked to the policies that we have a very mercantile. And where the National Bank is included in the work, everything must be transparent, difficult to deal with corruption. Therefore, we do not want to work.

- With regards to transparency. Maybe you did explain what motivated the decision to multibillion loans to individual banks to refinance?

- If you remember, the story began not with the bank Nadra, but with Prominvest. His problem, admittedly, have a surprise for us - we thought that a wise Matviyenko (Chairman of the PIBA. - Author.) Will not allow such a situation. Started panicking, which were under attack and other major banks, particularly those who had no major foreign parent institutions, but it was all the more deposits. Among them was the bank Nadra, which had 700 branches, 2 million depositors with deposits of almost 11 billion UAH. (at 01.10.08) - 5% of the deposits of the banking system! The most that either there is a systemic bank, which followed the fall of Prominvest would mean the inevitable collapse of the banking system.

The decision on the allocation of refinancing to financial recovery process had taken promptly and individually. Sometimes without a properly issued at that time to ensure that dooformlyalos then.

Therefore, observations

Chamber, by the way, they were all basically on the formal, even closer to a political basis, rather than actually takes decisions on the allocation of refinancing. The main claim for the majority of the NBU regulations is that they were not registered with the Ministry of Justice. But the claim is related regulations that were adopted for the entire system and are the regulations. А тех постановлений, которые принимались в индивидуальном порядке для каждого банка, эта норма не касается, поскольку это ведомственный акт.

И так практически по каждому пункту акта проверки Счетной палаты - у нас были свои объяснения, доводы и замечания. Причем поскольку это общественно-резонансный вопрос, то были решения правления, а не мои лично. Так вот, если вы, журналисты, хотите разобраться в этом вопросе не поверхностно, а серьезно, мы готовы предоставить вам материалы проверки Счетной палаты и наши. Можете вникнуть, проанализировать, разобраться. В данном вопросе плетка бьет не по коню, а по оглобле. Ударили, а точнее, прокукарекали, а дело не движется, поскольку выводы уводят в сторону от сути.

- А что вы можете ответить на многочисленные обвинения в участии Нацбанка в курсовых спекуляциях?

- Первое. За время своей работы в Национальном банке я ни разу ни одному коммерческому банку не сказал, какими будут изменения в курсовой политике. Это инсайдерская, строго конфиденциальная информация, и она должна исходить из НБУ только в те моменты, когда решение уже принято и введено в действие. Но никак не раньше.

Второе. Следственная комиссия Верховной Рады, вокруг деятельности которой было так много шума, встречалась со мной всего один раз. Депутаты пришли, мы им выделили помещение, создали условия для работы, они посидели, поспрашивали, почему такая ведется валютно-курсовая политика Нацбанка и что стоит за решениями по выделению рефинансирования. Запросили документы. Мы им в ответ принесли два центнера документов, попросили все почитать, разобраться, а после этого задавать вопросы. Они бумаги забрали, и в Нацбанке уже не появлялись. Зато приходили Генеральная прокуратура, МВД и та же Счетная палата - они серьезных нарушений в центральном банке не нашли.

- Обвинения сняты полностью? Конфликт можно считать исчерпанным?

- Та война, которую политики вели против Национального банка, сейчас приостановлена. Однако я не исключаю, что в сентябре, вместе с активизацией президентской гонки, она начнется заново. На электорат снова могут пытаться влиять с помощью спекуляций вокруг НБУ.

- Говорят, у политиков есть претензии к участию НБУ в качестве учредителя Всеукраинского депозитария ценных бумаг?

- Это вообще уму непостижимо, почему в нашей стране всегда пытаются вставить палки в колеса всем нормальным и рыночным инициативам! Много лет эту сферу раздирают корпоративные конфликты, даже международные финансовые организации, в том числе Всемирный банк, обращались к нам с рекомендациями упорядочить институт учета частной собственности через создание депозитария ценных бумаг, в котором бы не было внутренних конфликтов между акционерами.

Мы пошли на то, чтобы с участием Национального банка (который, кстати, обладает необходимой материально-технической и технологической базой, а также многолетним опытом депозитарной работы) создать депозитарий, который бы вывел систему учета собственности из-под угрозы корпоративных конфликтов. Однако некоторым людям очень не хочется, чтобы работала прозрачная модель, а хочется продолжать свары и иметь доступ к учету частной собственности. Вот в чем причина происходящего.

- Одна из наиболее часто предъявляемых к Нацбанку претензий - ошибочность решений о ревальвации в 2005-м и 2008 году, в результате которых сформировалось огромное отрицательное сальдо торгового баланса, ставшее, в свою очередь, одной из главных причин девальвации гривни…

- Я категорически против того, чтобы перекладывать вину с больной головы на здоровую. И ревальвация, и девальвация гривни стали платой за грубейшие ошибки и, если хотите, порой обыкновенную безалаберность в макроэкономической политике нескольких подряд правительств.

Эти шаги нельзя оценивать, вырывая их из контекста сложившихся на тот момент ситуаций. Решение об укреплении курса гривни в 2005 году мы принимали вместе с Сергеем Яременко, после того, как министр экономики Сергей Терехин дал официальный прогноз об укреплении гривни на конец года до 4,25 грн./долл.

Мы посчитали, что в результате спекуляций нерезидентов, которые начали массово входить на валютный рынок Украины в ожидании ревальвации, мы потеряем около 1,7 млрд. долл. из резервов. Just so. Поэтому было решено не по кусочку рубить, а одномоментно опустить с 5,31 до 5,05 грн., и это было сделано. А уже через несколько дней, когда я был в командировке, Яременко от этого решения отказался и говорил, что никакого отношения к нему не имеет. Это, в принципе, и стало причиной его ухода из Нацбанка. К чести Терехина, он от своих слов потом не открещивался.

Придание курсовой динамике большей гибкости в мае 2008 года было связано с необходимостью замедления чрезмерной ценовой динамики, системный всплеск которой был вызван бюджетными дисбалансами. Стремительное наращивание социальных платежей за счет сокращения капитальных расходов повлекло масштабные товарные дефициты, которые сопровождались ускорением инфляции, наращиванием импортных закупок, ухудшением внешнего торгового баланса и увеличением внешних заимствований для его финансирования.

Темпы роста социальных платежей из бюджета выросли в 2007 году в 2-2,35 раза. Уже в 2008 году началось снижение динамики инвестиций в производство. Не удивительно, что в подобных условиях уровни инфляции на потребительском рынке превысили 30%, а в промышленности - вплотную приблизились к 50%, превысив показатели 1998 года, когда наблюдалось инфляционное подавление производства на фоне углубляющегося валютно-финансового кризиса.

В этих условиях Национальный банк был вынужден ревальвировать гривню. Хотя основные инфляционные факторы и находились вне монетарной политики, НБУ должен был выполнять свою основную конституционную функцию по поддержанию стабильности национальной денежной единицы.

Надо понимать, что любое решение регулятора - будь-то ревальвация, девальвация или что-то еще - всегда бьет по чьим-то интересам. Но НБУ не может угодить каждому, поскольку решения принимаются в общих интересах.

- Но Совет НБУ настаивал, что делать этого не следует, и даже наложил вето на это решение НБУ.

- Тот факт, что Совет Нацбанка в то время накладывал отлагательное вето на решение правления об укреплении курса гривни, никак не связан с желанием не допустить ревальвации курса. Ее просто хотели отложить во времени на несколько дней. Мы предложили собрать Советпо такому и такому вопросу. В тот период один олигарх продавал другому 58 млн. долл., и продавцу не хотелось терять на операции деньги.

Когда мы сели и проанализировали эту ситуацию, решение правления НБУ было единогласным: вето надо преодолевать. Кроме того, среди полномочий Совета, которые выписаны в ст. 9 закона о Национальном банке, 9-м пунктом четко прописано, что этот орган может давать правлению НБУ только рекомендации в рамках Основ денежно-кредитной политики в отношении политики курсообразования и валютного регулирования. Право отлагательного вето к этим сферам компетенции правления не применяется.

Вместе с тем хочу сказать, что на данный момент никаких серьезных противоречий между Советом и правлением Национального банка не существует. Свидетельством тому - позитивная оценка Советом действий правления по реализации Основных направлений денежно-кредитной политики в 2009 году. При этом хочу обратить особое внимание, ст. 100 Конституции Украины наделяет именно Совет НБУ полномочиями осуществлять контроль за проведением денежно-кредитной политики. Те же, кто пытается наделить этими функциями другие органы (в том числе и временную следственную комиссию парламента), делают это вопреки Конституции Украины.

- Правительство все чаще обращается к НБУ с просьбой монетизировать ОВГЗ? Только с начала этого года Нацбанк увеличил объем этих бумаг на более чем 15 млрд. грн., а с начала ноября прошлого года - почти на 24 млрд. Президент уже раскритиковал такую политику. What would you say?